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Abstract. Third party tracking is the practice by which third parties
recognize users accross different websites as they browse the web. Re-
cent studies show that 90% of websites contain third party content that
is tracking its users across the web. Website developers often need to
include third party content in order to provide basic functionality. How-
ever, when a developer includes a third party content, she cannot know
whether the third party contains tracking mechanisms. If a website devel-
oper wants to protect her users from being tracked, the only solution is to
exclude any third-party content, thus trading functionality for privacy.
We describe and implement a privacy-preserving web architecture that
gives website developers a control over third party tracking: developers
are able to include functionally useful third party content, the same time
ensuring that the end users are not tracked by the third parties.
1 Introduction
Third party tracking is the practice by which third parties recognize users accross
different websites as they browser the web. In recent years, tracking technologies
have been extensively studied and measured [25, 28, 31, 36, 24, 33] – researchers
have found that third parties embedded in websites use numerous technologies,
such as third-party cookies, HTML5 local storage, browser cache and device
fingerprinting that allow the third party to recognize users across websites [37]
and build browsing history profiles. Researchers found that more than 90% of
Alexa top 500 websites [36] contain third party web tracking content, while some
sites include as much as 34 distinct third party contents [30].
But why do website developers include so many third party contents (that
may track their users)? Though some third party content, such as images and
CSS [3] files can be copied to the main (first-party) site, such an approach has a
number of disadvantages for other kinds of content. Advertisement is the base of
the economic model in the web – without advertisements many website providers
will not be able to financially support their website maintenance. Third party
JavaScript libraries offer extra functionality: though copies of such libraries can
be stored on the main first party site, this solution will sacrifice maintenance
of these libraries when new versions are released. The developer would need to
manually check the new versions. Web mashups, as for example applications that
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use hotel searching together with maps, are actually based on reusing third-
party content, as well as maps, and would not be able to provide their basic
functionality without including the third-party content.
Including JavaScript libraries, content for mashups or advertisements means
that the web developers cannot provide to the users the guarantee of non-
tracking. Hence, the promise to provide privacy has a very high cost because
there are no existing automatic tools to maintain control of third party tracking
on the website. To keep a promise of non-tracking, the only solution today is to
exclude any third-party content1, thus trading functionality for privacy.
In this paper, we present a new Web application architecture that allows
web developers to gain control over certain types of third party content. Our
solution is based on the automatic rewriting of the web application in such a
way that the third party requests are redirected to a trusted web server, with
a different domain than the main site. This trusted web server may be either
controlled by a trusted party, or by a main site owner – it is enough that the
trusted web server has a different domain. A trusted server is needed so that the
user’s browser will treat all redirected requests as third party requests, like in the
original web application. The trusted server automatically eliminates third-party
tracking cookies and other technologies.
In summary our contributions are:
– A classification of third party contents that can and cannot be controlled by
the website developer.
– An analysis of third party tracking capabilities – we analyse two mechanisms:
recognition of a web user, and identification of the website she is visiting 2.
– A new architecture that allows to include third party content in web appli-
cations and eliminate stateful tracking.
– An implementation of our architecture, demonstrating its effectiveness at
preventing stateful third party tracking in several websites.
2 Background and Motivation
Third party web tracking is the ability of a third party to re-identify users as
they browse the web and record their browsing history [31]. Tracking is often
done with the purpose of web analytics, targeted advertisement, or other forms
of personalization. The more a third party is prevalent among the websites a user
interacts with, the more precise is the browsing history collected by the tracker.
Tracking has often been conceived as the ability of a third party to recognize
the web user. However, for successful tracking, each user request should contain
two components:
User recognition is the information that allows tracker to recognize the user;
Website identification is the website which the user is visiting.
1 For example, see https://duckduckgo.com/. 2 Tracking is often defined as the
ability of a third party to recognize a user through different websites. However, be-
ing able to identify the websites a user is interacting with is equally crucial for the
effectiveness of tracking.
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Fig. 1. Third Party Tracking
For example, when a user visits news.com, the browser may make additional
requests to facebook.com, as a result, Facebook learns about the user’s visit
to news.com. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical example of such tracking where
facebook.com is the third party.
Consider that a third party server, such as facebook.com hosts different con-
tents, and some of them are useful for the website developers. The web developer
of another website, say mysite.com, would like to include such functional content
from Facebook, such as Facebook ”Like” button, an image, or a useful JavaScript
library, but the developer does not want its users to be tracked by Facebook. If
the web developer simply includes third party Facebook content in his applica-
tion, all its users are likely to be tracked by cookie-based tracking. Notice that
each request to facebook.com also contains an HTTP Referrer header, automat-
ically attached by the browser. This header contains the website URL that the
user is visiting, which allows Facebook to build user’s browsing history profile.
The example demonstrates cookie-based tracking, which is extremely com-
mon [36]. Other types of third party tracking, that use other client-side storage
mechanisms, such as HTML5 LocalStorage, or cache, and device fingerprinting
that do not require any storage capabilities, are also becoming more popular [25].
Web developer perspective A web developer may include third party con-
tent in her webpages, either because this content intentionally tracks users (for
example, for targeted advertising), or because this content is important for the
functioning of the web application. We therefore distinguish two kinds of third
party contents from a web developer perspective: tracking and functional. Track-
ing content is intentionally embedded by website owner for tracking purposes.
Functional content is embedded in a webpage for other purposes than tracking:
for example, JavaScript libraries that provide additional functionality, such as
jQuery, or other components, such as maps. In this work, we focus on functional
content and investigate the following questions:
– What kind of third content is possible to control from a server-side (web
developer) perspective?
– How to eliminate the two components of tracking (user recognition and web-
site identification) from the functional third party that the website embeds?
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2.1 Browsing Context
Browsers implement different specifications to securely fetch and aggregate third
party content. One widely used approach is the the Same Origin Policy (SOP) [14],
a security mechanism designed for developers to isolate legacy content from po-
tentially untrusted third party content. An origin is defined as scheme, host and
port number, of the URL3 of the third party content.
When a browser renders a webpage delivered by a first party, the page is
placed within a browsing context [2]. A browsing context represents an instance
of the browser in which a document such as a webpage is displayed to a user, for
instance browser tabs, and popup windows. Each browsing context contains 1)
a copy of the browser properties (such as browser name, version, device screen
etc), stored in a specific object; 2) other objects that depend on the origin of the
document according to SOP. For instance, the object document.cookie gives the
cookies related to the origin of the current context.
In-context and cross-context content Certain types of content embedded
in a webpage, such as images, links, and scripts, are associated with the context
of the webpage, and we call them in-context content. Other types of content, such
as <iframe>, <embed>, and <object> tags are associated with their own browsing
context, and we call them cross-context content. Usually, cross-context content,
such as <iframe> elements, cannot be visually distinguished from the webpage
in which they are embedded, however they are as autonomous as other browsing
contexts, such as tabs or windows. Table 1 shows different third party contents
and their execution contexts.
HTML Tags Third Party Content
in-context
<link> Stylesheets
<img> Images
<audio> Audios
<video> Videos
<form> Forms
<script> Scripts
cross-context
<(i)frame>, <frameset>, <a> Web pages
<object>, <embed>, <applet> Plugins and Web pages
Table 1. Third party content and execution context.
The Same Origin Policy manages the interactions between different browsing
contexts. In particular, it prevents in-context scripts from interacting with the
content from a cross-context content in case their origins are different. To com-
municate, both contexts should rely on inter-frame communications APIs such
as postMessage [12].
3 https://www.w3.org/TR/url/
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2.2 Third Party Tracking
In this work, we consider only stateful tracking technologies – they require an
identifier be stored client-side, the most common storage mechanism is cookies,
but others, such as HTML5 LocalStorage and browser cache are also stateful
tracking mechanisms. Figure 2 presents the well-known stateful tracking mech-
anisms. We distinguish two components necessary for successful tracking: user
recognition and website identification. For each component, we describe the ca-
pabilities of in-context and cross-context. We also distinguish passive tracking
(done through HTTP headers) and active tracking (through JavaScript or plugin
script execution).
User Recognition Website Identification
Passive Active Passive Active
in
-c
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te
x
t
HTTP cookies
Cache-Control
Etag
Last-Modified
-
Referer
Origin
document.URL
document.location
window.location
cr
o
ss
-c
o
n
te
x
t
Flash LSOs
document.cookie
window.localStorage
window.indexedDB
Referer document.referrer
Fig. 2. Stateful tracking mechanisms
In-context tracking In-context third party content is associated with the
browsing context of the webpage that embeds it (see Table 1).
Passively, such content may use HTTP header to recognize the user and
identify the visited website. When a webpage is rendered, the browser sends a
request to fetch all third party contents embedded in the page. The response
from the third party with the requested content may contain HTTP headers
that may be used for tracking. For example, Set-cookie HTTP header tells the
browser to save the third party cookies, that will be later automatically attached
to every request to this third party in the Cookie header. Etag HTTP header and
other cache mechanisms like Last-Modified and Cache-Control HTTP headers
may also be used to store user identifier [37]. To identify the visited website, a
third party can either check the Referer HTTP header, automatically attached
by the browser, or an Origin header4.
Actively, in-context third party content cannot use browser storage mecha-
nisms, such as cookies or HTML5 Local Storage associated to the third party
4 Origin header is also automatically generated by the browser when the third party
content is trying to access data using Cross-Origin Resource Sharing [4] mechanism.
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because of the limitations imposed by the SOP (see Section 2.1). For example, if
a third party script uses document.cookie API, it is able only to read the cookies
of the main website, but not those associated to the third party. This allows
tracking within the main website but does not allow tracking cross-sites [36].
For website identification, third party active content, such as JavaScript, can
use several APIs, such as document.location and others.
Cross-context tracking Cross-context third party content, such as iframe,
is associated with the browsing context of the third party that provided this
content.
Passively, the browser may transmit HTTP headers used for user recogni-
tion and website identification, just like with the in-context third party con-
tent. Every third-party request for cross-context content will contain the URL
of the embedding webpage in its Referer header. Note that this is true only for
the cross-context content, say an <iframe>, directly embedded in the webpage.
Within the iframe, there may be additional third party contents. Since they are
not embedded directly in the webpage, and because the iframe is an autonomous
though nested browsing context, requests to fetch contents embedded within this
context will carry, not the URL of the webpage, but that of the iframe in their
Referer header, and the origin of the iframe in their CORS requests Origin
header.
Actively, cross-context third party content can use a number of APIs to store
user identifier in the browser. These APIs include cookies (document.cookie),
HTML5 LocalStorage (document.localStorage), IndexedDB, and Flash Local
Stored Objects (LSOs). For website identification, document.referrer API can
be used – it returns the value of HTTP Referrer header transmitted to the third
party when the third party content was fetched. Because cross-context third
party is associated with its own browsing context, it is able to embed even more
third party contents within this cross-context.
Combining in-context and cross-context tracking Imagine a third
party script from third.com embedded in a webpage – according to the con-
text and to the SOP, it is in-context. If the same webpage embeds another third
party content from third.com, which is cross-context, then because of SOP, such
script and iframe cannot interact directly. However, script and iframe can still
communicate through inter-frame communication APIs such postMessage [12].
This communication between different contexts allow them to exchange the
user identifiers and the website that the user visits. Efficient implementation of
such combination of tracking may profit from easily implementable user recogni-
tion by cross-context code using, say document.cookie, and website identification
by in-context through various APIs such as document.location. For example, so-
cial widgets, such as Facebook ”Like” button, or Google ”+1” button, may be
included in the webpages as a script. When the social widget script is executed on
the client-side, it loads additional scripts, and new browsing contexts (iframes)
allowing the third party to benefit from both in-context and cross-context capa-
bilities to track users.
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3 Privacy-preserving Web Architecture
For third party tracking to be effective, it is necessary that it has two capa-
bilities: 1) it is able to identify the website in which it is embedded, and 2) to
recognize the user interacting with that website. Disabling only one of these two
capabilities for a given third party already prevents tracking. In order to miti-
gate the stateful tracking (see Section 2), we make the following design choices
in our architecture:
1. In-context content: prevent only user recognition. Preventing passive
user recognition for in-context content, such as images, forms and scripts is
possible by removing HTTP headers such as Set-cookie, ETag and others.
However, it is particularly difficult to remove active website identification
because trying to alter or redefine document.location and window.location
APIs, will cause the main page to reload.
2. Cross-context content: prevent only website identification. We pre-
vent passive website identification by instructing the browser not to send
HTTP Referer header along with requests to fetch a cross-context content.
Therefore, when the cross-context gets loaded, active website identification
is impossible. Indeed, executing document.referrer returns not the URL of
the embedding page, but an empty string. Because of the limitations of the
SOP, a website owner has no control over the cross-context third party con-
tent, such as iframes. Therefore, it is not possible to modify the results of
storage access APIs, such as document.cookie. We discuss other possibilities
to block such APIs in Section 4.3.
3. Prevent communication between in-context and cross-context con-
tents. Our architecture proposes a way to block such communications that
can be done by postMessage API. We discuss the limitations of this approach
in Section 4.3.
To help web developers keep their promises of non-tracking and still include
third-party content in their web applications, we propose a new Web application
architecture. This architecture has the capability to 1) automatically rewrite all
the third party in-context content of a Web application, 2) redirect the third
party HTTP requests issued by the in-context content, and 3) remove/disable
known stateful tracking mechanisms (see Section 2) for such third party content
and requests. 4) It also rewrites and redirects cross-context requests so as to
prevent website identification and communication with in-context scripts.
Figure 3 provides an overview of our web application architecture, that in-
troduces two new components that are fully controlled by the website owner:
Rewrite Server (Section 3.1) acts like a reverse proxy5 for the original
web server. It rewrites the web pages in such a way that all the third party
requests are redirected through the Middle Party Server before reaching the
intended third party server.
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy
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Fig. 3. Privacy-Preserving Web Architecture
Middle Party Server (Section 3.1) is at the core of our solution since
it intercepts all browser third party requests, removes tracking, then forwards
them to the intended third parties. When they reply, it also removes tracking
information and forwards the responses back to the browser. On one hand, it
hides the third party destination from the browser, and therefore prevents the
browser from attaching third party HTTP cookies to such requests. Because
the browser will still attach some tracking information to the requests, such as
ETag, and Referer headers, Middle Party Server will also remove this information
when forwarding the requests to the third party. This prevents passive user
identification for in-context third party contents.
On the other hand, the Middle Party Server prevents website identification
for cross-context contents and communication with in-context scripts. This is
done by placing the cross-context within another cross-context controlled by
the Middle Party server as illustrated by Figure 4. For instance, if an iframe
was to be embedded within a webpage, it is placed within another iframe that
belongs to the Middle Party. The Middle Party then instructs the browser not to
send Referer header while loading the iframe, which prevents passive and active
website identification once it is loaded. Since the iframe is nested within a iframe
that belongs to Middle Party, this hides its reference to in-context scripts (see
Figure 4). Therefore, it is prevented from communicating with in-context scripts
in the main webpage.
3.1 Rewrite Server
The goal of the Rewrite Server is to rewrite the original content of the requested
webpages in such a way that all third party requests will be redirected to the
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API Content
document.createElement inject contents from Table 1
document.write any content
window.open Web pages(popups)
Image images
XMLHttpRequest any data
Fetch, Request any content
Event Source stream data
WebSocket websocket data
Table 2. Embedding Dynamic Third Party Contents
Fig. 4. Prevent Combining in-context and cross-context tracking
Middle Party Server. It consists of three main components: static HTML rewriter
for HTML pages, static CSS rewriter and JavaScript injection component. Into
each webpage, we inject a JavaScript code that insures that all the dynamically
generated third party content is redirected to the Middle Party Server.
HTML and CSS Rewriter rewrites the URLs of static third party con-
tents embedded in original web pages and CSS files in order to redirect them to
the Middle Party Server. For example, the URL of a third-party script source
http://third.com/script.js is written so that it is instead fetched through the
Middle Party Server: http://middle.com/?src=http://third.com/script.js.
JavaScript Injection. The Rewrite Server also injects a script in an original
webpage, that controls APIs used to inject dynamic contents. This injected script
rewrites third party contents which are dynamically injected in webpages after
they are rendered on the client-side. Table 2 shows APIs that can be used to
dynamically inject third party content within a webpage that we control using
the injected script.
A Content Security Policy (CSP) [41] is injected in the response header
for each webpage in order to prevent third parties from bypassing the rewriting
and redirection to the Middle Party Server. A CSP delivered with the webpage
controls the resources of the page. It allows to specify which resources are allowed
to be loaded and executed in the page. By limiting the resource origins to only
those from the Middle Party Server and the website own domain, we prevent
third parties from bypassing our redirection to the Middle Party Server.
3.2 Middle Party
The main goal of the Middle Party is to proxy the requests and responses between
browsers and third parties in order to remove tracking information exchanged
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between them. For in-context contents, it removes any user recognition as well
as website identification information. For cross-context contents, it takes care of
preventing website identification and communication with in-context scripts.
In-Context Contents are scripts, images, etc. (see Table 1). Since a third
party script from http://third.com/script.js is rewritten by the Rewrite Server
to http://middle.com/?src=http://third.com/script.js, it is fetched through
the Middle Party Server. When the middle party receives such a request URL
from the browser, it takes the following steps. Remove Tracking from request
that are set by the browser as HTTP headers. Among those headers are Cookie,
Etag, If-Modified-Since, Cache-Control, Referer. Next, it makes a request to the
third party in order to get the content of the script http://third.com/script.js.
Remove Tracking from response returned by the third party. The head-
ers that the third party may send are Set-Cookie, Etag, Last-Modified, Cache-
Control. CSS Rewriter rewrites the response if the content is a CSS file. Finally,
the response is returned back to the browser.
Cross-context contents are iframes, links, popups, etc. (see Table 1).
For instance, a third party iframe from http://third.com/page.html is rewrit-
ten to http:// middle.com/?emb=http://third.com/page.html. When the Mid-
dle Party Server receives such a request URL from the browser, it takes the
following actions: URL Rewriting: instead of fetching directly the content
of http://third.com/page.html, the Middle Party Server generates a content
in which it puts the URL of the third party content as a hyperlink. <a href
= "http://third.com/page.html" rel = "noreferrer noopener"></a>. The most
important part of this content is in the rel attribute value. Therefore, noreferrer
noopener instructs the browser not the send the Referer header when the link
http://third.com/page.html is followed client-side. JavaScript injection mod-
ule adds a script to the content so that the link gets automatically followed once
the response is rendered by the browser. Once the link is followed, the browser
fetches the third party content directly on the third party server, without go-
ing through the Middle Party server anymore. Nonetheless, it does not include
the Referer header for identifying the website. Therefore, the document.referrer
API also returns an empty string inside the iframe context. This prevents it from
identifying the website.
The third party server response is placed within a new iframe nested within
a context that belongs to the Middle Party, and not directly within the site
webpage. This prevents in-context scripts and the cross-context contents from
exchanging tracking information as illustrated by Figure 4.
4 Implementation
We have implemented both the Rewrite Server and the Middle Party Server as
full Node.js [10] web servers supporting HTTP(S) protocols and web sockets.
Implementation details are available at https://webstats.inria.fr/sstp/.
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4.1 Rewrite Server
Simple Forward: requests that arrive to the Rewrite server are simply for-
warded to the main server.
HTML Rewriter is implemented with Jsdom HTML parser [8] and CSS
Rewriter using a CSS parser [5] for Node.js. JavaScript injection is done at
the end of rewriting webpages. The code script injected is available at https:
//webstats.inria.fr/sstp/dynamic.js. CSP set on webpages only whitelists
the website own domain and the Middle Party. It also prevents third party
plugins.
1 Content-Security-Policy: default-src ’self’ ’middle.com ’;
object-src ’self’;
4.2 Middle Party
In-Contexts Contents. Remove Tracking from requests component re-
moves tracking information from in-context third party requests (See Section 3).
The requests are then forwarded to the original third party server, to fetch the
third party content. Remove Tracking from responses : Tracking informa-
tion that are set by third parties in the responses, are removed. See Section 3
for details about information that are removed. CSS Rewriter: as in the case
of the Rewrite Server, this component is implemented using a a CSS parser [5]
for Node.js for rewriting CSS files.
Cross-Context Contents. URL Rewriting If the cross-context URL was
http://third.com/page.html, this URL is rewritten to
1 <a href="http: // third.com/page.html" rel="noreferrer
noopener" target=""></a>.
JavaScript injection : the content injected is as followed.
1 var third_party = document.getElementsByTagName("a")[0];
2 if(window.top == window.self){
3 third_party.target = "_blank";
4 third_party.click ();
5 window.close ();
6 }else{
7 var iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
8 iframe.name = "iframetarget";
9 document.body.appendChild(iframe);
10 third_party.target = "iframetarget";
11 third_party.click ();
12 }
Both the rewritten URL and the injected script are returned as a response to the
browser which renders it. The injected script gets executed within a context that
belongs to the Middle Party. If the original cross-context third party content was
to be loaded inside an iframe, the injected script creates an iframe in which the
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original third party content is loaded. However, if it was to be opened inside a
new tab, the injected script opens a new tab in which the third party content
is loaded. In both cases, while the cross-context content is loaded, the browser
does not sent the Referer header. This makes the value of document.referer
empty inside the cross-context preventing it from identifying the website. Fi-
nally, since those cross-context are loaded by the injected script from a context
that belongs to the Middle Party, in-context scripts cannot communicate with
the cross-context contents to exchange tracking information.
4.3 Discussion and Limitations
Our approach suffers from the following limitations. First, our implementation
prevents cross-context and in-context contents from communicating with each
other using postMessage API. However, in-context third party script can identify
the website a user visits via document.location.href API. Then the script can
include the website URL, say http://main.com, as a parameter of the URL of a
third party iframe, for example http://third.com/page.html?ref=http://main.com
and dynamically embed it in the webpage. In our architecture, this URL is
rewritten and routed to the Middle Party. Since, the Middle Party Server does
not inspect URL parameters, this information will reach the third party even
though the Referer is not sent with cross-context requests.
Another limitation is that of dynamic CSS changes. For instance, changing
the background image style of an element in the webpage is not captured by
the dynamic rewriting script injected in webpages. Therefore, if the image was
a third party image, the CSP will prevent it from loading.
Performance overhead There is a performance cost associated with the
Rewrite Server. Rewriting contents server-side and browser-side is also expensive
in terms of performance. Middle Party Server may also lead to performance
overhead especially for webpages with numerous third party contents. We believe
that server-side caching mechanisms may help to speed up responsiveness.
Extension to stateless tracking Even though this work did not address
stateless tracking, such as device fingerprinting, our architecture already hides
several fingerprintable device properties and can be extended to several others:
1) The redirection to the Middle Party anonymizes the real IP addresses of users;
2) Some stateless tracking APIs such as window.navigator, window.screen, and
HTMLCanvasElement can be easily removed or randomized from the context of the
webpage to mitigate in-context fingerprinting.
Possibility to blocking active user recognition in cross-context With
the prevalence of third party tracking on the web, we have shown the challenges
that a developer will face towards mitigating that. The sandbox attribute for
iframes help prevent access to security-sensitive APIs. As tracking has become
a hot concern, we suggest that similar mechanisms can help first party websites
tackle third party tracking. The sandbox attribute can for instance be extended
with specific values to tackle tracking. Nonetheless, the sandbox attribute can
be used to prevent cross-context from some stateful tracking mechanisms [9].
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5 Evaluation and Case Study
Demo website We have set up a demo website that embeds a collection of
third party contents, both in-context and cross-context. In-context contents
include images, HTML5 audio and video, and a Google Map, which further
loads dynamic contents such as images, fonts, scripts, and CSS files; a Youtube
video as a cross-context content. Our demo website is accessible at http://
sstp-rewriteproxy.inria.fr. When we deployed the Rewrite Server on http:
//sstp-rewriteproxy.inria.fr, the original server has been moved to http:
//sstp-rewriteproxy.inria.fr:8080, so that it is no longer directly accessible
to users. The Middle Party server runs at http://sstp-middleparty.inria.
fr.
Originally, when all the third parties were simply included in the main web-
page, they may have also been tracking the website users (see Figure 1). After
the deployment of our solution, we have been able to redirect all in-context third
party contents to the Middle Party. We have been able to prevent the website
identification in the cross-context Youtube video. In the Appendix, we show a
screenshot of requests redirection to the Middle Party Server.
Real websites Since we did not have access to a real websites, we can-
not install a Rewrite Server and to evaluate our solution. We therefore im-
plemented a browser proxy based on a Node.js proxy [11], and included all
the logic of the Rewrite Server within the proxy. The proxy is running at
http://sstp-rewriteproxy.inria.fr:5555.
We then evaluated the solution on different kinds of websites: a news website
http://www.bbc.com, an entertainment website http://www.imdb.com, and a
shopping website http://verbaudet.fr. All three websites load content from
various third party domains. In all websites, we rewrote all third party contents
through the proxy (acts as Rewrite Server) and the Middle Party Server removed
tracking information. Visually, we did not notice any change in the behaviors of
the websites. We also interacted with them in a standard way (clicking on links
on a news website, choosing products and putting them in the basket on the
shopping website) and all the main functionalities of the websites was preserved.
Overall, these evaluation scenarios have helped us improve the solution, es-
pecially rewriting dynamically injected third party content. We believe that this
implementation will even get better in the future when we convince to deploy it
for some real websites.
6 Related Work
Many studies have demonstrated that third party tracking is very prevalent on
the web today as well as the underlying tracking technologies [25, 36, 31, 28].
Lerner et al. [30] dusted the story of this practice for a period of twenty years.
Trackers have been categorized according to either their business relationships
with websites [31], their prominence [28, 25] or the user browsing profile that
they can build [36]. Mayer and Mitchell [31] grouped tracking mechanisms in two
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categories called statefull (cookie-based and super-cookies) and stateless (finger-
printing). It is rather intuitive to convince ourselves about the effectiveness of a
statefull tracking, since the latter is based on unique identifiers that are set in
users browsers. Nonetheless, the efficacy of stateless mechanisms has been exten-
sively demonstrated. Since the pioneer work of Eckersley [24], new fingerprinting
methods have been revealed in the literature [38, 22, 25, 19, 21, 17, 39, 33, 18]. A
classification of fingerprinting techniques is provided in [40]. Those studies have
contributed to raising public awareness of tracking privacy threats. Mayer and
Mitchell [31] have shown that users are very sensitive to their online privacy,
thus hostile to third party tracking. Englehardt et al. [26] have demonstrated
that tracking can be used for surveillance purposes. The success of anti-tracking
defenses is yet another illustration of users concern regarding tracking [32].
There are many defenses that try to protect users against third party track-
ing. First, major browser vendors do natively provide mechanisms for users to
block third party cookies, browse in private mode. More and more privacy-
browsers even take a step further, putting privacy as a design and implementa-
tion principle. Examples of such browsers are the Tor Browser [16], TrackingFree
Browser [34] or Blink [29]. But the most popular defenses are by far browser ex-
tensions. Being tightly integrated to browsers, they provide additional privacy
features that are not natively implemented in browsers. Well known extensions
for privacy are Disconnect [6], Ghostery [7], AdBlock [1], ShareMeNot [36], which
is now part of PrivacyBadger [13], MyTrackingChoices [20], MyAdChoices [35].
Merzdovnik et al. [32] provide a large-scale study of anti-tracking defenses. Well
known trackers such as advertisers, which businesses hugely depend on tracking,
have also been taking steps towards limiting their tracking capabilities [31]. The
W3C is pushing forward the Do Not Tracking standard [23, 27] for users to easily
express their tracking preferences so that trackers may comply with them. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate how a website owner
can embed third party content while preventing them from accidentally tracking
users. The idea of proxying requests within a webpage is inspired by web service
workers API [15], though the latter is still a working draft which is being tested
in Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome.
7 Conclusions
Most of the previous research analysed third party tracking mechanisms, and
how to block tracking from a user perspective. In this work, we classified third
party tracking capabilities from a website developer perspective. We proposed a
new architecture for website developers that allows to embed third party contents
while preserving users privacy. We implemented our solution, and evaluated it
on real websites to mitigate stateful tracking.
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Appendix
Screenshot of the demo website map console.
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the Browser console
